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Abstract
Over the course of the last decade, Bangladesh has implemented a broad-based program
of financial and market reforms, encompassing changes in the structure of the financial
system, prudential and supervisory frameworks, and monetary management. This paper
estimates a savings function to evaluate the impact of various determinants of private
savings in Bangladesh—with special emphasis on the impact of financial reform. The
results show that the level of income, real interest rates, and the share of agriculture in
GDP have a positive impact on the savings rate. Dependency rate and public savings
rate, on the other hand, have a negative impact on private savings. Interestingly, the
financial reform index has a negative impact on private savings. Hence reforms that
were initiated since the late 1980s had actually reduced savings.
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An explanation for this result can be traced to the state of the banking sector beginning
as early as 1972. Political interference dominated the selection of bank management and
loan portfolios. Loans were extended to institutions and individuals with high credit
risks leading to a high default rate. Moreover, the high proportion of effectively nonperforming assets also contributed to high interest margins and relatively low degree of
financial intermediation. Despite a number of positive changes that have been
introduced in the financial sector following reforms, these factors have adversely
affected private savings in the economy. The pace of reform has not kept in line with
the severity of the situation and further reforms in a timely fashion are necessary.
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Introduction

Since the early 1980s many developing countries have started to liberalize their
financial sector as part of wider structural adjustment programs that included fiscal
consolidation, reforms of the exchange rate and foreign trade system, price
liberalization, deregulation of activities, and other reforms with a view to improve the
supply responsiveness of the economy. This has been a part of a broader move towards
a reduced role for the government in the economy. The process has varied widely,
however, in terms of both speed and sequencing.
The theoretical support for financial liberalization as a policy goal can be traced to the
fundamental theorem in welfare economics and the efficient market hypothesis. The
fundamental theorem suggests that competitive markets lead to Pareto optimal
equilibria, while the efficient market hypothesis argues that the financial markets use
information efficiently. A combination of these two ensures the efficiency of the real
economy and the reflection of the fundamentals of the economy in the financial
markets. Reform of the financial system removes any market distortions that impede
these free market conditions (Eatwell, 1996; Mavrotas and Kelly, 2001).
Proponents for the reform of the financial sector argue that it will lead to significant
economic benefits, in particular through a more effective domestic savings mobilization
and a more efficient resource allocation process, by reducing intermediation spreads,
financial deepening, and enhanced access to credit. This follows from Mckinnon (1973)
and Shaw's (1973) argument that in a financially repressed economy, interest rates
remain below its market clearing value thereby generating less than the optimal amount
of savings and thus detracting from the pool available for investment.1 A World Bank
study has also found that the paucity of financial savings, due to government rationing
of available credit to so-called priority sectors, has an adverse effect on economic
growth by reducing both the volume and the productivity of investment (World Bank,
1989).2
Various studies have tried to evaluate the impact of financial liberalization on private
savings in a number of both developed (Bayoumi, 1993a, 1993b; Caporale and
Williams, 2001; Chapple, 1991) and developing countries (Bandiera et al., 2000; DayalGulati and Thimann, 1997; Demetriades and Luintel, 1997; Fry, 1995; Hussain, 1996;
Jbili et al., 1997; Loayza and Shankar, 2000; Melo and Tybout, 1986).3 However, the
results have been inconclusive.

1 The difference between McKinnon (1973) and Shaw's (1973) hypothesis is in the transmission
mechanism through which a change in interest rates lead to a positive impact on savings.
2 An alternative view considers the effect of including the informal loan market into the original
Mckinnon-Shaw models, and finds that interest rate liberalization may, in fact, lower output growth
(see Mavrotos and Kelly 2001 on this issue).
3 See Williamson and Mahar, 1998, for a detail literature review.
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Some of these studies have shown that financial reform may increase the level of
savings by widening the range of available savings instruments and increasing the
expected return through higher real interest rates and reduced risks, as deeper markets
make financial assets more liquid. On the other hand, it has also been argued that
financial reform may actually decrease savings by reducing liquidity constraints
through, say, improved access to consumer credit (see, for example, Bayoumi, 1993 and
Ostry and Levy, 1995).
Most of the studies on the developing countries have concentrated on specific regions,
for example, East Asia (Fry, 1995; Lahiri, 1989), North Africa (Jbili et al., 1997) and
Latin America (Melo and Tybout, 1986). One region that has not received much
attention is South Asia.4 This study intends to fill the gap in the literature by empirically
analyzing the behavior of the determinants of private savings in Bangladesh, with
special emphasis on the impact of financial reform.
The hypothesis in this paper is that there exists a stable relationship between the level of
private savings and its determinants including a measure of financial reform. This
information is crucial to the actual impact of financial reform on savings, as an accurate
calibration of both long-run and dynamic effects of various government policies on
private savings would allow inferences about the macroeconomic implications of
financial liberalization.
Developing countries have historically been characterized by financial repression.
Bangladesh has been no exception. Prior to the late 1980s, the financial sector in
Bangladesh was characterized by complex guidelines for credit allocation, centralized
lending by the central bank to public enterprises, absence of indirect monetary policy
instruments, fixed and negative (in real terms) cost of funds, lax business supervision,
and an inadequate accounting system.
Beginning in the late 1980s, Bangladesh became one of the first countries in South Asia
to embrace reform. It has adopted a gradual approach to financial sector reform and has
implemented a broad-based program of encompassing changes in the structure of the
financial system, prudential and supervisory frameworks, and monetary management. A
number of features characterize the opening up of the markets. First, monetary
authorities have dismantled a number of directed-credit schemes and eased interest rate
controls with financial institutions being given the freedom to determine interest rate
structure. Second, interest rates have increased to positive real levels by the mid 1990s.
Third, the capital base of the banks have been somewhat strengthened by
recapitalization and public issues. Fourth, identification of non-performing assets,
classification of assets, provision for bad debts and recognition of income have been
tightened up and prudential norms have been introduced. Finally, access to the equity
market have been substantially widened.
For estimation purposes, cointegration tests are conducted and error correction models
are generated. The results show that although most of the traditional determinants of
private savings had their expected impact, financial reform had an adverse effect on
savings. Explaining this adverse effect is important for at least three reasons. First, if

4 Exceptions include studies by Khan et al. (1997) on Pakistan and Demetriades and Luintel (1997) and
Loayza and Shankar (2000) on India.
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reforms have led to a reduction in savings and, thus potential growth, then some reforms
would have to be reversed to achieve potential growth. Second, given the adverse effect
on savings it can be argued that reliance on external savings to finance investment has
introduced an element of volatility by making macroeconomic management more
difficult and the economy more vulnerable. Third, understanding the causes behind the
adverse impact of reform on private savings is important for determining the
sustainability of the current account deficit in Bangladesh. In fact, if the underlying
cause of this particular response of private savings was a consumption boom caused by
financial reform and an increase in asset prices, the sustainability of the current account
deficit would be a matter of concern (Lopez-Mejia and Ortega, 1998).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical link between
financial reform and the level of savings and introduces a number of empirical studies;
while Section 3 presents the financial sector reforms undertaken in Bangladesh. The
estimating model is introduced in Section 4 and the estimation results are presented and
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 analyzes the policy implication of the results. The
paper ends with concluding remarks in Section 7.

2

Financial reform and savings

2.1 Theoretical issues
Before formally modeling the impact of financial reform on savings, it would be useful
to establish how these two variables may be linked to one another.
Financial reform involves the elimination of credit controls, deregulation of interest
rates, easing of entry into the financial services industry, development of capital
markets, increased prudential regulation and supervision, and liberalization of
international capital flows.
Reform increases competitive efficiency within the financial market in at least three
ways. First, the removal of regulations and price distortions permit savings to be
directed into highest-yielding (risk-adjusted) forms of investment (improved allocative
efficiency). Second, increased competition reduces the cost of financial intermediation
(higher operational efficiency). Third, the reform measures generate an improved range
of financial products and services adaptable to changing consumer needs (dynamic
efficiency). Although financial reforms can increase the efficiency with which resources
are channeled into productive use, its impact on the quantity of savings is theoretically
ambiguous.5
From an analytical point of view, the impact of financial reform on savings include a
direct, short-term, and an indirect, long term, effect. The direct effect works through the
price and quantity channels. The price channel reflects the impact of reforms on savings
through changes in the real interest rates. Fry (1978, 1995) reports that, across a sample
of fourteen Asian countries, the gross national savings rate is positively affected by

5 Financial liberalization and financial reform are used interchangeably in this paper.
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higher real interest rates. However, the positive response is small and diminishes in later
years.6 Reynoso (1989) finds that savings increase rapidly as real interest rates move
from sharply negative to just below zero, but that the effect levels off at low positive
real interest rates and becomes negative as interest rate rises. This raises the possibility
of a nonlinear relationship between interest rates and savings, perhaps involving
threshold effects. Bangladesh moved away from negative real interest rates after the
liberalization process started.
The quantity channel affects savings by expanding the supply of credit to creditconstrained consumers. A number of studies have argued that the high level of savings
evident in countries in East Asia and Japan can be contributed not to high interest rates
but to bank expansion in rural areas and the availability of low-yielding but safe deposit
instruments (Loayza et al., 2000).They estimated that a one percentage point increase in
the ratio of private credit flows to income reduces the long-term private saving rate by
0.74 percentage point. This seems to indicate that the expansion of credit reduces
private savings as economic agents are able to finance increased consumption at their
current income level.
Financial liberalization, that leads to large capital flows, can also have short term
implications for savings. Bandiera et al. (2000) have argued that the impact on savings
of financial liberalization comes through the related changes in the availability and cost
of credit, expected income growth, and increased wealth due to higher property values.
2.2 Empirical results
The empirical results, however, have not been consistent across countries. Hussain
(1996) estimated that, in the three years following reforms, savings in Egypt increased
by about 6 percent of GDP over the level that would have occurred in the absence of
financial liberalization. However, Bayoumi (1993a) showed that financial deregulation
in the United Kingdom led to a decline in the personal savings ratio of 2.3 percentage
points over the 1980s. Chapple (1991) also reported a decline in both household and
corporate savings in New Zealand following liberalization. Evidence from Turkey
during the 1970s and 1980s demonstrated that a negative income effect from higher
interest rates outweighed the positive substitution effect on the private savings rate
(Uygur, 1993).
Financial liberalization has also been shown to lead to consumption boom and consumer
lending in a number of countries, including, the United Kingdom (Bayoumi, 1993b),
Mexico, and Thailand. Using the overlapping generation framework, Bayoumi (1993b)
has shown that a move from a financially regulated to a deregulated system will make
savings more sensitive to changes in income, wealth, demographics, and real interest
rates. In addition, there will be a transitional decline in savings associated with higher
real interest rates and a larger current account deficit. While transitional, the duration of
this effect depends upon overlapping generations within the economy. In summary,
there is conflicting evidence in the literature regarding the impact of financial

6 Giovannini (1983) showed that Fry's results are sensitive to changes in the sample period or region
employed.
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liberalization on domestic savings. No clear pattern of results or consistent conclusions
emerge from the studies.

3

Financial sector reforms in Bangladesh7

Bisat et al. (1992) and Jbili et al. (1997) have discussed the actual and ideal sequencing
of financial sector reform in a developing country. Usually, reform begins with interest
rate liberalization, the introduction of market-based instruments of monetary policy,
such as government or central bank securities with market-determined interest rates, and
initial measures to strengthen banking supervision. Steps to increase competition among
banks, and the development of the equity markets and nonbank financial services, are
usually later measures in the reform process.8
3.1 Historical overview of financial reform
At independence in 1971, Bangladesh inherited a repressive financial system,
incorporating controls over interest rates, directed credit, complex rules for money and
capital markets, and overvalued exchange rates. The problem was worsened by the
nationalization of all financial institutions in the country.
After an extended period in the 1970s of political uncertainty, extensive government
intervention in the economy, and poor growth performance, the government initiated an
ambitious growth-oriented strategy in 1979. This strategy targeted increased saving and
investment combined with extensive structural reforms.
Even in the early 1980s, the financial sector was highly repressed. The small and
relatively underdeveloped sector was dominated by government-owned commercial
banks which accounted for more than 90 percent of the system's total assets. The
complex structure of interest rates were subject to controls; while extensive quantitative
credit controls were in place. Weak supervisory banking frameworks and political
interference led to an alarmingly growing share of non-performing bank loans. There
was no active capital market. Foreign currencies were strictly regulated and the
domestic currency, taka, was highly overvalued.
Changes in the financial system since the onset of liberalization around 1989 have been
substantial, with steady progress toward a more open and market-oriented system.
The process initially began with the privatization of state-owned enterprises in the

7 For a more detailed discussion on the extent of financial reform in Bangladesh see Chowdhury, 2000,
Hossain et al., 1999, and Willem van der Geest, 2001.
8 With respect to the sequencing of different elements of structural reforms, the conventional wisdom is
first to liberalize the trade and the exchange rate systems for current account transactions, then
liberalize the domestic financial system, and eventually open up the capital account. According to this
view, the creation of a rational system of relative prices reflective of conditions in world goods
markets need to precede financial sector reform (see, among others, McKinnon, 1982; Blejer and
Sagari, 1987; and Jbili et al., 1997 on this issue). The reform of the capital account should come later
due to the potentially destabilizing effects of reversible capital flows, which may aggravate any
negative effects of domestic financial reform.
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mid-1970s in the backdrop of a significant deterioration of the general economic
condition in the country (Chowdhury, 2000). Attempts were made to implement reforms
with the encouragement and technical support of the country's principal donors. This led
to the privatization of two nationalized commercial banks (NCBs) in 1982 and
permitting private commercial banks to operate.
However, the economy had been suffering from a lack of soundness in the banking
sector for more than a decade. This reflected the underlying weaknesses in the banks
and in their surrounding environment, such as, the regulatory framework and the legal
and judiciary system. A second phase of the adjustment process started in the mid1980s, when the combination of fiscal tightening and structural reforms, especially
unification of the foreign exchange market and trade liberalization, helped in reducing
inflation and improving the external current account situation. Real per-capita GDP
growth remained low, however, in part because of continuing structural distortions.
The process of investigating the nature of the banking problem culminated in the
formation of the National Commission on Money, Banking and Credit in 1984. In
response to the Commission's report submitted in 1986, the government launched the
Financial Sector Reforms Program (FSRP) in 1990 with financial assistance from a
number of donor agencies.
3.2 Financial sector reform program
The key reform areas in the Financial Sector Reform Program (FSRP) were (Van Der
Geest, 2001):
—

interest rate liberalization for both deposit and lending

—

purposes

—

abolition of sectorally directed lending

—

improving the assessment of quality of loan portfolios through the adoption of
international standards of loan classification

—

strengthening banking supervision

—

improving the operation of money market instruments

—

improving the operation of capital markets

—

improving loan recovery through improved legislation on bankruptcy and
improved credit information.

After the financial reform process started, considerable progress was made in moving
away from the previous system of direct controls in the banking system as well as in
revising loan classification and provisioning criteria to make loan recovery issue more
transparent, revising the legal provisions and procedures for enforcing loan recovery,
and improving availability of credit risk information.
An interest amnesty program was also introduced and the Financial Loan Courts Act
was passed to facilitate prosecution of defaulters. The Credit Information Bureau was
established in the Bangladesh Bank to record the performance of borrowers, and the
Large Loan Review Cell was set up to review all newly sanctioned bank loans over
Taka 10 million (now less than $200,000).
6

Interest rate controls were withdrawn on deposits in February 1997. For the purpose of
lending, interest rate bands were provided to the banks, ranging from 8-10 percent
annually on loans for exports, and to 10-14 percent annually on loans to agriculture. The
aim of these bands was to allow the banks some flexibility in pricing their loans but, in
effect, did little more than limit competition since the actual rates charged clustered
around the upper limits. As part of the Bangladesh Bank's continuing efforts to reform
the system, however, these bands were also withdrawn in July, 1999 (ADB, 2000).
3.3 Macroeconomic overview
The overall macroeconomy has on balance provided a relatively stable and favorable
environment for financial sector development during the last decade (see Table 1). The
economy can be characterized by reasonably prudent macroeconomic management
reflected in fairly high and stable real GDP growth rate; and exports and workers'
remittances from abroad rising over the period. This has boosted banking sector
liquidity through a steady increase in deposits that have grown faster than nominal
GDP. Inflation has been relatively low and the exchange rate fairly stable. Fiscal
deficits have been manageable, averaging less than five percent of GDP, and in general
prudence has limited the part of deficit financing coming from the banking system
(World Bank, 2000).
The liberalization of trade and current foreign exchange transactions were undertaken in
parallel with the liberalization of foreign direct investment and portfolio equity
investment. Rapid progress have also been made in liberalizing current foreign
exchange transactions with the debt/export ratio decreasing significantly. Still many
microeconomic distortions present a serious structural imbalance to the economy. This
can be seen in the high external debt/GDP ratio and increases in gross capital
formation/GDP ratio which is reflected in chronic current account deficit.
Table 1 Major Economic Indicators, Bangladesh

Real GDP Growth

Ann. Ave.

Ann. Ave.

1983-92
4.6

1993-2000
4.89

1998
5.2

1999
4.9

2000
5.5
3.4

Inflation Rate

8.8

6.15

7.0

8.9

M2 Growth

17.33

12.67

11.4

15.4

18.6

Fiscal Balance/GDP

1.13

2.08

-4.1

-4.8

-6.1

Curr. Acc. Balance/GDP

-1.09

-1.23

-1.1

-1.4

-1.0

8.6

9.0

9.5

Debt-service ratio
1980

1990

1999

2000

Gross Domestic Savings/GDP

2.2

12.9

17.7

21.4

Gross Capital Formation/GDP

14.8

17.1

22.2

22.4

Resource Gap/GDP

12.6

4.2

4.5

1.0

Fiscal Balance/GDP

-9.1

-0.4

-6.1

-6.1

Trade Balance/GNP

-9.8

-7.3

-5.7

Total External Debt/GNP

24.4

41.81

37.12

308.5

244.1

182.4

Total External Debt/Exports
1

2

Notes:
1995 figure; 1998 figure
Source: Asian Development Bank: Asian Development Outlook (2001), Table 2.18, Asian
Development Bank: Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries (2000).
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3.4 Assessment of reform
Table 2 provides an assessment of the position held by Bangladesh with respect to the
various dimensions of financial liberalization, such as, capital controls, interest rates,
entry barriers, government regulation of operations, privatization, and international
capital flows. Comparisons are made between 1973, the year the Mckinnon-Shaw
hypothesis was developed for arguing the case for financial reform (Mckinnon, 1973;
Shaw, 1973), and 1999. The conditions are classified as repressed (R), partly repressed
(PR), or largely liberalized (LL) in each dimension. Williamson and Mahar (1998)
describe a ‘repressed’ system as one in which virtually all decisions in the relevant
dimension are made by the government; a ‘largely liberalized’ system indicates a
system that is basically market oriented but still shows signs of government control in
certain areas; and partly repressed represent a system which is much closer to the
‘repressed system’ than to the ‘largely liberalized’ system.
The Table shows that financial repression was almost universal in 1973. The country
had directed-credit and interest rates that were regulated by the government. Entry to the
banking system was rigidly controlled, and commercial banks, most of which were state
owned, had little autonomy. Exchange controls on current account transactions
prevailed.
In comparison, the current situation is significantly different. Since the beginning of
reform in 1989, monetary authorities have scaled back directed credit, liberalized
interest rates, and allowed some competition in the banking sector. Most interest rates
are determined by market forces. The remaining five dimensions in Bangladesh show
partially repressed system.9
Table 2 History of Financial Liberalization in Bangladesh, 1973-1999
1989 a

Financial Reform Begins in
Credit Controls
1973
1999
Interest Rates
1973
1999
Entry Barriers
1973
1999
Gov't Regulation of Operations
1973
1999
Privatization
1973
1999
International Capital Flows
1973
1999
State-owned Bank's Share of Total Banking Assets
1973b
1999c
Overall Budget-deficitd
Before Reform
After Reform

R
PR
R
LL
R
PR
R
PR
R
PR
R
PR
74
68
-0.7
-1.1

Notes: a LL = largely liberalized; R = repressed; PR = partly repressed; b one year prior to reform; c figure
shows the share of total deposits; d calculated as a percentage of GDP, five year average.
Source: Williamson and Mahar (1998), Asian Development Bank and author's calculation.

9 A detailed list of the changes in the financial sectors in Bangladesh are given in Appendices I and II.

8

In Table 3a, the performance of the financial indicators after reform is compared with
comparable data from about a decade preceding the reform. In a number of areas, the
indicators improved in the reform period over the pre-reform era. The financial
deepening variable (M2/GDP) showed progress in financial development; while the
efficiency of intermediation as measured by the ratio of reserve money to total deposits
and the ratio of reserve money to quasi-money also confirmed strong progress in
financial development. Real interest rates also increased in the post-reform period.
When financial depth is measured as broad money minus currency in circulation,
divided by GDP, the post-reform period show a substantial increase in the ratio
compared to the earlier period.10
Table 3b shows the correlation coefficient between the level of private savings and the
indicators of financial sector reform. During all three periods reported, the correlation
coefficient between savings and the financial deepening and financial development
variables have the expected signs and are all statistically significant at the 1 percent
level. Private savings and real interest rates show a negative correlation during the entire
sample as well as the post-sample period; while it is positive in the pre-reform period. In
absolute terms, the interest rate variable shows a higher degree of correlation with
private savings during the pre-reform than the post-reform period.
Table 3a

Indicators of Financial Sector Reform (in percent)
Pre-reform

Post-reform

M2/GDP

27.80

36.80

Real interest rate

2.08

3.61

Reserve money/Time Deposit

31.50

27.80

Reserve money/Quasi money

42.50

33.40

Quasi money/GDP

17.59

20.38

Spreadb

0.67

4.92

Table 3b

Notes:

b

c

Correlation of Financial Variables with the Private Savings Rate

Savings

a

a

Entire period

Pre-reform period

Post-reform period

1.00

1.00

1.00

RINT

-0.05

0.32

-0.06

M2GDP

0.87

0.74

0.65

RESTOT

-0.71

-0.14

-0.62

RESQUASI

-0.88

0.76

-0.68

Pre-reform: 1982-89; Post-reform: 1990-2000
Spread = lending rate - deposit rate.

c

At the 5 percent significance level, a correlation coefficient is statistically significant, if its absolute value
exceeds 0.05.

Variables: Savings—private domestic savings as percent of GDP; RINT—real interest rate; M2GDP—ratio of M2 to
GDP; RESTOT—ratio of reserve money to total deposit; RESQUASI—ratio of reserve money to quasimoney.
The entire period refers to 1982-2000, a period covering a decade approximately before and after the reform
process started. The pre-reform period covers from 1982 to the start of the reform process in each country,
while the post-reform period covers from the start of the reform process to 2000.
Source:

International Financial Statistics, IMF; Asian Development Bank.

10 In measuring the effect of financial intermediation, it is essential to distinguish the liquidity function
of the financial systems from the credit creating function. Hence currency and demand deposit should
be deducted from M2 as they are not expected to be responsive to interest rate changes. Moreover,
including liquid assets make it difficult to distinguish the effects of financial development from the
evolving process of monetization, as these assets relate to the ability of the financial system to provide
liquidity and do not reflect the development of the financial sector, which is what the financial
intermediation ratio attempts to capture. (see De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) on this issue).
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4

The savings equation

4.1 The model
Based on the discussion in Section 2, an empirical savings function can be derived for
this study. Specifically, the savings rate (s/y)t can be modeled as a function of the
natural log of real per capita income (yt), real interest rate (rt), financial liberalization
index (flt), dependency ratio (dept), share of agriculture in GDP (agrt), and the ratio of
public savings to gross national disposable income (pubst).11 Thus,
(s/y)t = a0 + a1yt + a2rt + a3flt + a4dept + a5agrt + a6pubst

(1)

where, following Dayal-Gulati and Thimann (1997), private savings is calculated as
domestic investment plus the current account surplus minus public savings.
4.2 Rationale for including various determinants
The inclusion of real per capita income is pretty standard in the savings literature
(Lahiri, 1989). First, because savings and economic growth have been highly correlated
over long time horizons as well as for many regions and stages of development (DayalGulati and Thimann, 1997). Second, because savings is directly associated with output
through investment, so that, to the extent that it increases domestic investment, higher
domestic savings will generally result in higher growth if the economy is below its
steady state. However, the impact of income on savings has been inconclusive. The
simple permanent income theory predicts that higher economic growth reduces private
savings because forward-looking consumers who expect their permanent incomes to rise
will dissave against future income. In contrast, the intertemporal optimizing models,
such as, the life-cycle model, suggest that individuals save mainly to smooth their
consumption path over time in accordance with their anticipated lifetime income.
Subsequent extensions of the basic life-cycle model of savings have incorporated the
idea that individuals also save for bequest motives and for unexpected expenses
suggesting a positive relationship between income and savings.12
There are additional channels through which growth can positively affect savings in a
developing country. Growth and higher incomes raise more households above the
subsistence level, below which they cannot save, and make households more responsive
to changes in the interest rate (Ogaki et al., 1996). Most of the cross-country empirical
studies find that permanent increase in income have a positive effect on private savings
rate (Maddison, 1992; Bosworth, 1993).13

11 In addition, a number of other factors have been theorized to affect private savings. These include, but
are not limited to, macroeconomic stability measured by inflation, external factors including current
account balance, foreign savings, and terms of trade, etc [Williamson and Mahar (1998), Dayal-Gulati
and Thimann (1997)]. However, given the small sample size available for this study, inclusion of any
additional variables would have led to serious degrees of freedom problem.
12 See, for example, the paper by Blanchard and Fischer (1989).
13 Ogaki et al. (1995) have shown that private savings in low- to middle-income countries are positively
affected by the per-capita income relative to that of the United States. Initial estimates with this
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The real interest rate captures the effects of financial reform and deepening. It is
measured as the difference between one year time deposit rate and the expected rate of
inflation. To overcome the problem of unobservable expected inflation rate, it is
assumed that expectations are formed according to the adaptive expectation model, that
is,
pet - pet-1 = b(pet - pet-1)

(2)

where b is the coefficient of expectations such that 0<b<1.14
The theoretical literature is ambiguous about the effect of a change in interest rates on
savings because the income and substitution effects of such a change work in opposite
directions.
The next variable, dependency ratio (dept), captures the life-cycle effect and is included
to measure the impact of demographic variables on the savings rate. In the life-cycle
model of household behavior, savings is viewed as being motivated by the desire of
households to smooth lifetime consumption in the face of uneven income flows. The
savings rate of the working age population is positive, whereas that of the retired and
young population is negative. An increase in the ratio of the non-working age
population to the working age population thus lowers the savings rate.15 Following
Khan et al. (1994), the dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of the difference between
the total population and the employed labor force to the total population. An inverse
relationship is expected between the dependency ratio and private savings (Lahiri, 1989;
Bosworth, 1993). Loayza et al. (2000) have used panel data to show that an increase in
the young-age dependency ratio by, say 3.5 percentage points leads to a decline in the
private savings rate of about 1 percentage point. Lahiri (1989) and Muhleisen (1996)
also finds the age-dependency ratio to be an important determinant of private savings in
a number of Asian countries.
Given the predominance of agriculture in economic activity in Bangladesh, it is clear
that a large share of the population face uncertain income. Theory predicts that greater
uncertainty should increase savings as risk averse consumers set aside resources as a
precaution against possible adverse changes in income (Skinner, 1988). Rural incomes
are more uncertain than urban incomes and, in the absence of financial markets through
which risks can be diversified, rural residents would save a greater fraction of their
income. Edwards (1996) reports empirical support for this view. The share of
agriculture to GDP captures the impact on savings of such an occupation structural
variable.

variable showed that the results are similar to those reported in the paper. Hence further analysis was
not performed.
14 Khan and Hasan (1997) uses a similar adaptive expectation model. We have also experimented with
alternative expectation scheme, such as, perfect foresight (a=1) and static expectations (a=0). Initial
estimates gave results which are similar to those reported in this paper.
15 An alternative view follows from evidence suggesting that the savings rate of the elderly is not
significantly lower than that of the younger population, a phenomenon that is sometimes attributed to
the existence of an altruistic bequest motive for savings. An inference drawn from the similarities of
savings rate found among different age groups is that a shift toward a more elderly population will
have little effect on the savings rate. See Leff (1984) on this issue.
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Fiscal policy can potentially affect private savings through revenue policy (say, tax
structure), expenditure policy (say, income redistribution), or the extent of public
savings. The rationale is to find out the extent to which the private sector in Bangladesh
internalize the government budget constraint and hence the extent to which an increase
in public savings is offset by an increase in private savings. Hence public savings is
included here. The variable is measured as the ratio of public savings to gross national
domestic income.
4.3 Measuring financial market reform
Our next variable for measuring financial market reforms is difficult to quantify.
Virtually, all studies have used the degree of monetization of the economy—generally
measured as the ratio of M2 to GDP—to capture the degree of financial development
(Dayal-Gulati and Thimann, 1997). The coefficient has been found to be significant in a
number of studies (see, among others, Edwards, 1996; Johansson, 1996) leading to the
conclusion that financial markets development has a positive net effect on savings.
A more rigorous measure of financial reform for Bangladesh is developed here. The
resulting variable measures exogenous changes in the six dimensions of financial
reform as described in Williamson and Mahar (1998): the elimination of credit controls;
the deregulation of interest rates; free entry into the financial services sector;
government regulation of operations in financial institutions; privatization; and,
liberalization of international capital flows. Based on an analysis of the historical
evolution in each case (as described in Appendix I), we have identified the timing of
major moves towards a more liberalized financial structure. Following Bandiera et al.
(2000) and Demetriades and Luintel (1997), we have created a 0-1 dummy variable,
with 1 representing the more liberalized regime. This gives us a matrix of 0-1 variables.
Demetriades and Luintel (1997) have shown that the use of all these dummy variables in
the estimation process would lead to an unacceptable reduction in degrees of freedom—
a common problem in the developing countries where long time series on
macroeconomic aggregates are rarely available. We avoid this problem by calculating a
summary measure of financial liberalization using the principal-components theory
(Theil, 1971).
For this purpose, we construct the principal components of the matrix. Then we estimate
the financial reform index by using the weighted average of the more important
principal components, using as weights the fraction of the total standard deviation
explained by each component.16 The index includes the five largest principal
components accounting for about 95 percent of the total variation in the six dimensions
of liberalization. A strong positive correlation is found between the index and each of
the six dimensions. With reforms in the financial sector, the value of the financial
reform index will increase.
A linear transformation of the financial reform measure, with 1972=100, is shown in
Figure 1. The Figure corresponds reasonably well with the policy shifts that has taken
place during the sample period, 1973-1999. The year 1973 shows a big drop in the

16 This is same as including the principal components separately and imposing the restriction that their
coefficient is proportional to the fraction of the total variance explained by each one of them.
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index. This reflects a financial sector that is characterized by directed credit for
agriculture with extensive credit guarantees from the Bangladesh Bank. The complex
structure of interest rates were subject to government controls. This period also saw the
nationalization of all domestic commercial banks and public enterprises abandoned by
the former owners from West Pakistan. The banking sector was hobbled with lowproductivity and inadequate internal supervision.
After 1975, there was a gradual privatization of public industrial enterprises. This is
reflected in the gradual increase in the index in late 1970s. The index rose sharply in
1982 when two nationalized banks were privatized and the government permitted new
private commercial banks to operate.
Pervasive political patronage in the allocation of resources practiced during General
Ershad's military government of 1982-90 had severe consequences for the quality of
loan portfolios of both the nationalized and private commercial banks (Van Der Geest,
2001). Even the privatization of the two bank in 1982 were financed through borrowing
from the other nationalized commercial banks. Consequently, the index decreased in the
mid-eighties. During 1988-89, the index was stable. Corresponding to the reform
process started by the government under the Financial Sector Reform Program (FSRP),
the index started to increase in 1990 and continued its upward trend in the early 1990s.
In February, 1997 interest rate controls were replaced by interest rate bands where
banks were allowed some flexibility in pricing their loans. This is reflected by a rise in
the index in 1997. A further increase occurred in 1999 when the government withdrew
interest rate bands.

Figure 1
Trends in private saving/GDP ratio in Bangladesh
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5

The estimation results

Equation (1) assumes an instantaneous adjustment of the actual stock of private savings
to its desired level, that is, an equilibrium state between the supply and demand for
private savings. This is unlikely, given the existence of transaction costs and
uncertainty. Moreover, the desired level of private savings is unobservable. So a
distinction is made between the long- and short-run behavior of private savings by
specifying an error-correction mechanism (ECM) of actual private savings toward their
desired (long-run) level. The advantage of the ECM formulation is that, while retaining
the long run equilibrium information, parameters describing the extent of short-run
adjustment are immediately provided for by the regression equation.
The empirical investigation begins with an analysis of the time series properties of the
variables of interest for the savings function. This would help to avoid the spurious
regression problem that arises when statistical inferences are drawn from non-stationary
time series. Unit root tests and cointegration techniques are employed to deal with the
spurious regression problem. The dynamic ordinary least squares estimator (Stock and
Watson, 1993) is used to determine empirically the number of cointegrating vectors and
the adjustment parameters. While the presence of cointegration would show the longterm relationship among the variables included in this study, the ECM would shed light
on the short-term dynamics in the model. The sample period covers 1973-99. While we
considered using higher frequency data to increase the number of observations, there is
little to be gained by simply increasing the frequency of observations while maintaining
the same time span (Hakkio and Rush 1991).17 Data for all the variables are collected
from two sources: Statistics and Data Systems Division of the Asian Development Bank
and the International Financial Statistics published by the International Monetary Fund.

5.1 Unit root tests
As a first step in the empirical analysis, we use the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF)
and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests to investigate the presence of unit roots in the level
variables as well as in their first differences. The null hypothesis tested is that the
variable under consideration has a unit root against the alternative that it does not. The
lag length is selected by the Final Prediction Error (FPE) criterion.18 Table 4 reports
tests of stationarity around a non-zero constant. As shown in the Table, the null
hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for the levels.19 The results of testing for
unit roots after differencing the data once are shown in the bottom section of the Table.
In this case, both tests reject the null hypothesis. The analysis in this paper, therefore,
treats all variables as integrated of order one.

17 Moreover, the use of higher frequency data would require extrapolating some series which are
available only on an annual basis.
18 The FPE method is based on an explicit optimality criterion of minimizing the mean squared
prediction error. The criterion tries to balance the risk due to bias when a lower order is selected, and
the risk due to increase in the variance when a higher order is selected.
19 We also tested for stationarity around a deterministic linear time trend. The results (not shown here)
are similar to those reported.
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Table 4 Stationarity Test Results
ADF

PP

(s/y)t

-1.60

-1.74

yt

-1.65

-1.29

rt

-0.88

-1.36

flt

0.29

-0.65

dept

-1.21

-0.76

agrt

-1.62

-1.86

1.51

-0.75

Levels

pubst
Differences
d(s/yt)

-6.21

-17.76

d(yt)

-4.76

-19.09

d(rt)

-3.67

-14.99

d(flt)

-3.18

-13.09

d(dept)

-8.05

-18.30

d(agrt)

-6.34

-26.90

d(pubst)

-4.76

-32.35

Note: d denotes the first difference of a variable.
For a variable x, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) statistic is
calculated from the regression:

d(xt) = a0xt-1 + bid(xt-i) + c + ut
The critical values are given in Mackinnon (1991). The 5 and 1 percent
critical values are -2.94 and -3.61, respectively.

Table 5 Estimates of the Cointegrating Vector of Savings
Variables
Constant

Test for Statistical
Significance

Estimate
-0.720
(-1.94)

yt
rt
flt
dept
agrt
pubst

0.104

15.143

(3.78)

(0.03)

0.077

26.029

(2.68)

(0.00)

-0.026

19.291

(-3.72)

(0.02)

-0.633

23.166

(-7.24)

(0.00)

0.740

38.140

(3.78)

(0.00)

-0.336

30.151

(-6.12)

(0.00)

Cointegration Tests
Dickey Fuller:

-3.070

Augmented Dickey Fuller (1):

-3.642

Augmented Dickey Fuller (2):

-4.151

Note: The dependent variable is the savings ratio.
The figures in parentheses below the coefficient estimates are the tstatistics.
The estimates include lags and leads of up to second order of the first
difference of each of the regression. In order to avoid overparameterization
due to the small number of observations, only the significant lags and leads
are retained.
The statistical significance test has a chi-square distribution with one
degree of freedom. Figures in parentheses below the statistical significance
tests are the p-values.
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5.2 Cointegration test
Since all the variables have a unit root, the existence of a cointegrating vector is a
necessary condition for any sensible interpretation of the results (Engle and Granger,
1987). So cointegration tests are performed to test for the presence of a long-run
relationship among private savings and its various determinants. The cointegration
results are summarized in Table 5. Given the relatively small sample size, a single
equation estimation method is employed. Specifically, the dynamic ordinary least
squares (DOLS) estimator (Saikkonen, 1991; Stock and Watson, 1993) is used. This is
asymptotically equivalent to Johansen's (1988) maximum likelihood estimator in the
case where the variables are integrated of order one and there is a single cointegrating
vector. The primary reason for selecting the DOLS estimator is its good small sample
properties. This criterion is specifically important for this paper given the small sample
size.20
In Table 5, using the Dickey-Fuller (1979) critical values as suggested in Stock
and Watson (1993), the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at least at the
5 percent level. The null hypothesis in favor of more than one cointegrating vector is
also rejected when these statistics are adjusted for degrees of freedom. The presence of
one cointegrating vector indicates a stable long-run equilibrium relationship between
private savings and its determinants. Moreover, the last column in Table 5 reports chisquared statistics for testing the significance of individual variables in the cointegrating
vector. Each variable is significant with the p-value less than or equal to 0.02.
5.3 Error correction model
Given the presence of cointegration, the Representation theorem developed in Engle and
Granger (1987) can be used to show that an error correction model (ECM) exists for the
cointegrating vector estimated earlier. So these results are supplemented by the
estimation of an ECM for savings:
d(s/y)t = a0 + a1d(s/y)t-1 + a2d(yt) + a3d(rt) + a4d(flt)
+ a5d(dept)+ a6d(agrt) + a7d(pubst) + a8ect-1

(3)

where ect-1 is the lagged residual from the cointegrating regression. The model includes
the lagged cointegrating vector, first order lag of the first differences of the regressors
included in the cointegrating equation, and lagged value of the dependent variable.
The statistical adequacy of the error correction equation is checked using a battery of
tests. These diagnostic tests, reported in the bottom half of Table 6, indicate that the
ECM performs well on purely statistical grounds. The diagnostic statistics test against
several alternative hypotheses—residual autocorrelation (DW and AR), autoregressive
conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH), and heteroscedasticity (RESET), and skewness

20 Another available estimator would be the Engle-Granger (1987) static ordinary least square estimator.
However, Stock and Watson (1993) have shown that the Engle-Granger estimator would exhibit
substantial bias due to the small sample size. The asymptotically normal distribution of the DOLS, as
opposed to the nonstandard asymptotic distribution of the Engle-Granger estimator, is another factor
for its choice (See Park and Phillips (1988) on this issue).
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and excess kurtosis (Normality). None of the diagnostic statistics reveal a problem and
hence the model is adequate for further analysis. The adjusted R2's value of 0.62 is
normal for regressions based on first differences in variables.
Table 6 Error Correction Model for the Savings Function
d(s/y)t = a0 + a1d(s/y)t-1 + a2d(yt) + a3d(rt) + a4d(flt)
+ a5d(dept) + a6d(agrt) + a7d(pubst) + a8ect-1

Note:

Variables

Estimates

Constant

0.014 (3.51)

d(s/y)t-1

0.138 (4.70)

d(yt)

0.377 (4.85)

d(rt)

0.042 (2.16)

d(flt)

-0.019 (3.15)

d(dept)

-0.235 (-5.26

d(agrt)

0.454 (2.72)

d(pubst)

-0.202 (-3.82)

ect-1

-0.138 (-2.56)

R2

0.62

D.W.

1.91

AR F[4,14]

1.00

ARCH F[4,10]

0.74

RESET F[1,17]

0.19

NORMALITY x2(2)

1.66

Figures in parentheses are the t-statistics.

D.W. tests first-order serial autocorrelation.
AR F[q,T-k-q] test qth order residual autocorrelation.
ARCH F[q,T-k-2q] is the F-test for autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity.
RESET F[q,T-k-q] is the qth order Ramsey-Reset Statistics.
NORMALITY is the Jarque-Bera test for skewness and excess
kurtosis. It has a chi-square distribution with two degrees of
freedom.
There are T observations and k regressors in each model under the
null. The value of q may differ across statistics, as may those of k
across models. T=27.

5.4 Interpretation of the results
Next, we compare the long- and short-run relationship between savings and its
determinants. The income coefficient has a positive and statistically significant impact
at both the long and short time horizon. This tends to confirm the theoretical
relationship as shown in an intertemporal optimizing model, such as, the life-cycle
model. It also reconfirms the findings reported in several cross-country empirical
studies (Maddison, 1992; Bosworth, 1993; and Carroll and Weil, 1994).
The real interest rate exerts a statistically significant positive impact on private savings
rate. This means that the positive substitution effect of an increase in real interest rate
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outweighs the negative income effect.21 This result is different from several other
studies using pooled time series-cross country data that couldn't pin down a positive
effect of increases in the interest rate on savings (see Bandiera et al. (2000) on this
issue).
The coefficient on the dependency ratio has the expected negative sign and is
statistically significant implying a positive relationship between the private savings rate
and the share of working-age people in the total population.
As expected, the sign on the share of agriculture in GDP variable is positive and
significant providing support to the precautionary savings motive. Given the
predominance of agriculture in economic activity in Bangladesh and given the
uncertainty related to agricultural income, the positive coefficient shows that farmers
have a higher propensity to save than people in other profession.
The coefficient for public savings is negative and statistically significant in both Tables.
This provides evidence that the private sector internalize the government's budget
constraint. The ‘offset’ coefficient, in absolute terms, is 0.202. This is within the range
found in other developing countries where the value ranges from 0 percent (Haque and
Montiel, 1989) to 50 percent (Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1991; Bandiera et al., 2000)
also reported a negative relationship between private and public savings rate in eight
developing countries.
Interestingly, since the coefficient on public savings is statistically less than one, we can
reject full Ricardian equivalence.22 In a Ricardian world, an isolated cut in taxes or an
increase in government expenditures would lead to an equivalent rise in private
spending because individuals would expect an equivalent discounted tax increase in the
future. Under these conditions, as articulated in Barro (1974), fiscal policy is unable to
directly affect savings.
Ricardian equivalence assumes that individuals' consumption choices fit a life-cycle
model of consumption, they are forward looking and effectively ‘infinite-lived’ through
a bequest motive that is inspired by each generation's concern about the welfare of the
next generation. However, once the generational linkage breaks down, there isn't a
complete offset. Further, even in the presence of bequest motives, Ricardian
equivalence may not hold if some individuals are liquidity constrained or if markets are
incomplete. In a developing country like Bangladesh, a large percentage of private
saving is carried out by the wealthiest individuals. They usually leave bequests to their
heirs, do not face binding liquidity constraints, and, consequently, might smooth their

21 It should be pointed out that the real interest rate variable was found to be highly correlated with the
inflation rate. The correlation coefficient was found to be 0.76. It implies that during our sample
period, the nominal rates adjusted rather slowly to changes in economic fundamentals and that, on
average, changes in inflation were dominating the movements in real interest rates. In addition to
government controls, the rigidity in nominal interest rates has been due to a number of factors,
including the oligopolistic nature of the domestic banking system; inadequate banking supervision;
and thin domestic money, credit, and capital markets.
22 The Ricardian equivalence doctrine states that public debt issues are macroeconomically
indistinguishable from tax increases, and thus a change in public savings should be offset by an equal
and opposite change in private savings.
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consumption over the life-cycle. This may explain why the Ricardian equivalence may
seem counterintuitive in Bangladesh.
Loayza and Shankar (2000) and Edwards (1996) also rejected the Ricardian equivalence
for India and a number of Latin American countries, respectively. Bandiera et al.
(2000), however, found support for the Ricardian equivalence in three (and depending
upon specification, five) out of eight developing countries considered in their study.
Of particular interest is the finding that, irrespective of the time horizon, the financial
liberalization index has a statistically significant negative impact on private savings
indicating that Bangladesh cannot rely on financial liberalization to stimulate growth
through higher levels of savings. This confirms similar findings reported for Korea and
Mexico in Bandiera (2000). It, however, doesn't eliminate the possibility of at least
reducing the less productive uses of loanable funds in these countries through reforms
that strengthen market discipline and provide more autonomy to financial institutions.
5.5 Policy multipliers
Finally, in order to analyze the effect of each policy change on financial depth, impact
and long-run policy multipliers are calculated. Following the method described in
Demetriades and Luintel (1997), we first calculate the total contribution of each
standardized policy variable in the financial reform index (say, ai). This is performed by
adding up the cross-product terms between the weight of each principal component in
the index and the element in the companion eigenvector which corresponds to a given
policy, i. Next, we take the product of ai and the estimated regression coefficient to get
the long-run influence of each standardized policy variable, bi. Finally, we divide each
of the calculated bi by the sample standard deviation to find the influence of a unit
change in each of the policy variables.
The impact multipliers are also calculated in a similar manner. The ai's and bi's are
multiplied by the regression coefficients of the change in the index and the lagged error
correction term. This gives us the dynamic responses due to the error correction and the
direct impact of the index, respectively. These two responses are then added and the
sum divided by the corresponding sample standard deviation to obtain the impact
multipliers.
The multipliers are reported in Table 7. The values indicate that various financial
repression policies had a significant impact on financial depth in Bangladesh. The cost
of controlling the deposit rates either through fixing the rate or imposing ceiling or
floors, has been very high. The policy of fixing the deposit rate, for example, led to a
long run reduction in financial depth by 9.43 percent; while enforcing deposit rate
ceilings and floors reduced financial depth in the long run by 8.14 and 7.58 percent,
respectively. The reduction in financial depth due to lending rate controls ranged from a
low of 4.02 percent to a high of 5.72 percent. The impact of a lending rate ceiling (4.02
percent) is almost half the impact of a deposit rate ceiling (8.14 percent). Fry (1995) has
attributed this difference to the fact that lending rate ceilings are more easily evaded
than deposit rate ceilings. Demetriades and Luintel (1997) also report similar findings
for India. In case of an increase in the intensity of the directed credit program, the longrun reduction in financial depth is around 9.77 percent. This is almost twice the figure
reported for India in Demetriades and Luintel (1997).
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Table 7 Impact and Long Run Multipliers on Financial Depth
Policy

Impact
Multiplier

a

Long-run
Policy Multiplier

Fixed Lending Rate

-4.95

Lending Rate Ceiling

-3.15

-4.24

Lending Rate Floor

-2.90

-4.02

Fixed Deposit Rate

-7.10

-9.43

Deposit Rate Ceiling

-5.26

-8.14

Deposit Rate Floor

-5.12

-7.58

Reserve ratio (1% increase)

-0.04

-0.66

Liquidity ratio (1% increase)

-0.28

-1.32

Directed credit (intensity inc.)

-6.14

-9.77

Real interest rate (1% decrease)

-0.92

-1.40

Note:

a

-5.72

percentage change in financial depth

The Table also reports the effect of a permanent one percentage point reduction in the
real interest rate. This would lead to a fall in financial depth of 1.4 percent.
Alternatively, for every one percentage point increase in the real interest rate, financial
depth increases by 1.4 percent. Note that this number is lower than the increase in
financial depth that can be achieved by removing restrictions on deposit and lending
rates.

6

Search for an explanation

There is now an extensive body of research highlighting the economic benefits that can
be reaped from reforms in the financial sector, in particular through a more effective
domestic savings mobilization and a more efficient allocation of resource (see World
Bank (2001) for a detailed discussion on this issue).
The widely held view of a strong positive correlation between the opening up of the
financial sector and the level of household savings has been the cornerstone of reform
policies advocated by the donor agencies. However, our results from Bangladesh
contradict this view by showing that financial reform policies have, in fact, led to a
decrease in private savings. Now the question is, how can the widely held view in the
literature and also among donors and policy makers be reconciled with these empirical
findings? The answer can be found by analyzing the current state of the financial sector
in Bangladesh.
6.1 Overview of the financial system
Let us begin our analysis by looking at the formal financial sector. It is at a relatively
early stage of development in terms of both diversity as well as the range of products
offered. The banking sector dominates the financial system, accounting for more than
95 percent of its total assets. The banking institutions comprise of the central bank—
Bangladesh Bank, three nationalized banks, one partially nationalized bank, twenty-
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seven private domestic banks, thirteen foreign banks, and five government-owned
specialized development banks.23
The nationalized commercial banks (NCB) dominate the commercial banking sector
accounting for about two-third of its assets, although the share has been declining over
the last two decades due, in part, to the privatization of two nationalized commercial
banks in 1982 (IMF, 1998). The specialized banks were created with special mandates
to address the financial needs of clients in a specific sector, for example, agriculture or
manufacturing, and used as a means of granting subsidies to these sectors. Although
their deposit-taking is relatively small (less than 5 percent of all bank deposits), they
provide 17 percent of all bank advances, financed by large borrowing from the
Bangladesh Bank. The foreign banks with a stable share of around 8 percent of bank
assets in recent years are active mainly in international transactions (IMF, 1998). Other
segments of the financial sector include two government-controlled and about three
dozen private insurance companies, and two stock exchanges.
6.2 Bank soundness
By most measures, the banking system in the country is unsound and has seen very little
improvement in recent years. One way to assess bank soundness would be to evaluate
the banks' solvency or capital adequacy, quality of their loan portfolio, and the liquidity
position. By each of these standards, the banking system falls far below the accepted
international norm. Almost all banks suffer from highly inadequate capital and
provisioning measures, low quality assets, and unsatisfactory management and
operating environment (IMF, 1998).
The problems in the banking system that have adversely affected private savings since
the start of the reform process can be traced to its large non-performing loan (NPL)
portfolio and high spreads to cover provisioning and management costs. In addition, low
loan recovery rates, an inadequate legal framework, poor governance, and limited
capacity of the Bangladesh Bank to effectively perform its regulatory and supervisory
role have also exacerbated the problem.
6.3 Non-performing loans
The loan classification and loss provisioning criteria in Bangladesh are less rigorous
than the international ‘best practice’ standards as reflected in the ‘Basel Core Principles
for Effective Banking Supervision’ (IMF, 1998). Table 8 reveals the lack of rigor in the
loan classification criteria used in the banking circle. In 1997, for example, loans were
classified as ‘substandard’ when overdue for 9 to below 24 months (international
standard: 4-6 months); ‘doubtful’ for 24 to below 36 months (international standard:
7-12 months), and ‘bad’ for 36 months or more (international standard: 13 months or
more).

23 These figures are as of June 2000. The number of private banks are increasing rapidly as the
government has decided to provide permission to open new banks on a regular basis.
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Table 8 Bank Loan Classification and Loss Provisioning Criterion
Loan
Classification

Bangladesh
Standard

Global
Standard

Provisioning
Requirement
For Loans

Sub-standard

9-23 months

4-6 months

10 percent

Doubtful

24-35 months

7-12 months

50 percent

Bad

36 months
and more

13 months
and more

100 percent

Source:

International Monetary Fund (1998) and author's calculation.

Despite a less rigorous loan classification and loss provisioning criteria in Bangladesh
relative to the international ‘best practice’ standards, the problems with non-performing
loans would become evident even to a casual observer. Table 9 provides a list of
summary performance indicators for the banking system. It shows that the share of nonperforming loans is very high and has been rising in recent years. The classified loans
ratio rose from around 34 percent in early 1990s to more than 38 percent in late 1999.
While the proportion of substandard and doubtful loans in classified loans decreased in
the 1990s, the proportion of bad loans actually increased from 58 to 80 percent over the
same period. What is alarming is the performance of the nationalized commercial banks.
Their classified loans share increased steadily from 32 percent in 1994 to 47 percent in
1999. On the other hand, the private domestic banks reduced their share of nonperforming loans from a high of 45 percent in 1994 to 29 percent in late 1999. The
foreign banks cut their share of NPL by half over the same period. Further, NPLs were
particularly pervasive in the specialized development banks where the ratio exceeded 65
percent and was increasing.
The provisioning shortfall situation of the domestic banks have significantly worsened
in recent years. Table 9 shows that for domestic banks, actual provisioning as a percent
of required provisioning fell from 59 percent in 1994 to 42 percent in 1999.
Nationalized banks saw the ratio drop by half from 67 percent in 1994 to 36 percent in
1999. Private domestic banks, however, saw an increase in the ratio from 46 percent to
57 percent over the same period. Only foreign banks met their provisioning requirments.
As the loan classification standards, on which the required provisions are calculated, are
less rigorous in Bangladesh than international practice, estimates based on the latter
would show larger provisioning shortfalls. Similar arguments can be made to show that
the Table, in fact, understates the non-performing loan problem when measured by the
more stringent international standards.
The World Bank has estimated that, based on international standards, the NPL ratio in
Bangladesh would be around 50 percent for all domestic commercial banks. For
purposes of comparison, we can look at Table 10 which gives the NPL figures for the
countries affected by the Asian currency crisis in 1997. NPL as a proportion of total
loans varied from a low of 35 percent in Malaysia to a high of 75 percent in Indonesia.
Another interesting feature of the NPL is that about nine-tenths of the NPL are to the
private sector and within this group the NPLs are highly concentrated. Some initial
estimates by the IMF put the expected loan losses of the banking sector at about
6 percent of GDP [IMF (1998)].
Table 11 shows the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of the banking sector during 1996-99.
The ratio for the domestic banks hover around single digit while those for the foreign
banks reach high teens. As the CAR for the domestic banks are less than the share of
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NPL in total loans, capitals in domestic banks have been practically wiped out in
Bangladesh. Only the foreign banks have enough capital to cover their required quota.

Table 9 Summary performance indicators in the banking system, 1994–99
1994

1996

1996

1997

1984

Dec.

Dec.

Dec.

Dec.

Dec.

Dec.

34.8

32.0

31.5

32.7

35.4

38.3

36.3

33.9

33.3

34.8

37.7

40.7

Nationalized commercial banks

32.1

31.0

32.6

36.6

40.4

47.0

Private domestic banks

44.5

39.4

34.8

31.4

32.7

29.0

Foreign banks

8.8

5.4

4.7

3.4

4.1

4.2

Memorandum item:
Specialized development banks

—

—

50.9

65.7

66.7

67.9

Classified loans by group of bank 1
Domestic banks

Total classified loans by category 1,3

1999

34.8

32.0

31.5

32.7

35.4

38.3

Substandard 2

19.2

13.1

13.4

10.6

5.2

8.0

Doubtful 2

17.6

12.4

12.3

15.7

8.2

11.7

Bad 2

58.6

69.8

74.3

73.8

86.7

80.3

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

94.6

93.6

93.7

93.4

93.1

93.3

Nationalized commercial banks

62.7

61.9

62.1

61.5

60.7

60.8

Private domestic banks

32.0

31.7

31.6

31.9

32.4

32.5

5.4

6.4

6.3

6.6

6.9

6.7

60.3

48.3

53.9

48.6

44.2

42.8

Loan market shares

1

Domestic banks

Foreign banks
Actual provisioning in % of required
provisioning
Domestic banks

59.4

47.0

52.8

47.4

43.0

41.8

Nationalized commercial banks

67.0

47.2

50.0

45.2

38.5

36.2

Private domestic banks

45.8

46.6

58.3

52.2

54.4

56.8

103.2

112.5

122.4

137.5

132.4

128.3

Foreign banks

Source

IMF (2000), Table 29.

Notes

1

In per cent of total loans.

2

In per cent of classified loans.

3

Includes overdue agriculture short-term loans of 4.6 and 4.8 per cent of all classified loans in 1994
and 1995 respectively.

4

Adjusted to exclude interest suspense and in per cent of total loans excluding interest suspense.

Table 10 Non-performing Loans in Countries Affected by the 1997 Asian Currency Crisis

Note:

a

Country

a
NPL

Indonesia

75

Korea

50

Malaysia

35

Thailand

55

NPL = non-performing loans as a percentage of total bank loans in 1997

Source: The Wall Street Journal, 9 December, 1998.
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Table 11

Capital Adequacy Ratio, 1996-1999 (in percent)

Capital Adequacy Ratio
Domestic commercial banks
a
NCBs

Dec.
1996

Dec.
1997

Dec.
1998

June
1999

6.6
6.0

7.5
7.2

7.3
6.5

7.2
6.5

5.6

6.6

5.2

5.4

Specialized banks

6.2

6.0

7.0

7.1

Private banks

7.1

8.4

9.2

9.2

Foreign banks

17.8

16.5

17.0

14.7

Actual capital in percent

80.5

91.8

90.6

88.6

of required capital
Domestic commercial banks

73.5

87.9

81.3

81.2

NCBs

69.6

82.8

65.3

67.1

Specialized

77.1

75.1

87.1

89.1

Private banks

81.2

98.9

113.5

113.9

Foreign banks

181.0

172.4

184.4

163.6

a

Note: NCBs = nationalized commercial banks.
Source:

IMF: Bangladesh: Recent Economic Developments, March 2000, Table 31.

6.4 Factors contributing to large non-performing loans
The reasons for the increase in the NPLs in the banking system can be traced to events
as early as 1972. Following independence in 1971, the banking sector was nationalized
and remained strictly under government-control. The high degree of state control is
reflected in political interference in the selection of Directors to the Bank Boards,
composition of their management teams, and in their loan portfolios. Political pressure
is exerted for lending to institutions and/or individuals with high credit risks.
Consequently, commercial banks have failed to follow true banking practices and skills
leading to inadequate banking supervision. Bank loans were disbursed mainly to the
publicly-directed sectors without proper commercial consideration; the internal control
and account systems of the banks were weak, and the quality of bank assets was not
evaluated on strict accounting principles (IMF, 1998). This led to an unabated increase
in NPL.
6.5 Direct efficiency loss due to non-performing loans
Much of the borrowing in developing countries come from banks, and the cost of this
finance accordingly also depends on the operational efficiency and competitiveness of
the banking market. One measure of this performance is the intermediation spread.
Recent evidences have suggested that liberalization of bank interest rates has widened
this spread in many countries. While the median of average quoted spreads in the
developed economies shrank during the second half of 1990s to just over 300 basis
points, the corresponding figure for developing economies continued to widen beyond
800 basis points (Honohan, 2001). Some of this increase is due to more refined loan
pricing in the liberalized environment, better reflecting the higher default risk in a
typical developing country bank portfolio.24 Some, however, will reflect an increased
exercise of market power by banks and bankers in internally liberalized banking
24 Another plausible explanation could lie in the link between high funding interest rates and the higher
risk of lending (Agenor et al., 1999).

24

markets; especially where capital has been eroded for various reasons, banks will be
keen to use their new freedoms to build up capital through the exercise of market power
(World Bank, 2001).
Van Der Geest (2001) has shown that the direct efficiency losses due to the NPLs in
Bangladesh have kept the spreads between deposit and lending rates artificially high.
Figure 3 shows the spread, calculated as the difference between the lending and deposit
rate (see also Table 12). Interest rates in Bangladesh have been characterized by low
deposit rates on bank accounts, high interest rates on loans in domestic currency, and a
high and relatively stable margin between loan and deposit rates.
Figure 2
Financial reform index in Bangladesh, 1972–2000

Figure 3
Interest rate spread in Bangladesh
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Table 12

Deposit Rate and Lending Rate of Scheduled Banks
Year

Deposit Rate

Lending Rate

1975-76

4.23

11.62

1976-77

4.32

11.03

1977-78

4.22

10.66

1978-79

4.27

11.12

1979-80

4.31

11.04

1980-81

6.98

13.07

1981-82

7.29

13.53

1982-83

7.36

13.35

1983-84

8.11

13.75

1984-85

8.13

14.50

1985-86

8.54

14.66

1986-87

8.59

14.70

1987-88

8.69

14.66

1988-89

8.88

14.68

1989-90

9.06

14.83

1990-91

9.11

14.99

1991-92

8.11

15.12

1992-93

6.51

14.39

1993-94

5.34

12.78

1994-95

4.86

12.22

1995-96

6.11

13.41

1996-97

6.67

13.69

1997-98

7.07

14.02

1998-99

8.90

14.46

1999-2000

9.10

14.60

Note:

Rate of interest on scheduled banks (weighted average as at end quarter)

Source:

Bangladesh Bank, Economic Trends and Chowdhury (2000), Table 3.

6.6 Cost of large spread
The large spread had a negative impact on both savings and investment in the economy.
Low deposit rates have discouraged private savings whereas the high real commercial
lending rates have discouraged investment. The spread is the result of the quasimonopolistic role played by large nationalized banks that are burdened with nonperforming loans and other operating inefficiencies. If one adds the implicit cost of
holding large unremunerated cash reserves and excess reserves for clearing and
payments, and also considers the risks involved in lending to borrowers with limited
collateral, the courts' inefficiency in collecting nonperforming loans, and, ultimately, the
profit margin of the investors, it is not surprising that the spread between deposit and
lending rates is so high. Inability to fully use the indirect instruments of monetary policy
and the lack of efficient interbank market activities have also contributed to this large
spread. Spread made domestic savings instruments very expensive, and hence
unattractive, and discouraged financial intermediation, thus depressing both savings and
lending volumes.25

25 Seck and Neli (1993), on the other hand, has suggested that the high spread between lending and
deposit rates can be viewed as an implicit tax through high reserve requirements on the banking sector
by the monetary authorities.
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7

Conclusions

Over the course of the last decade, Bangladesh has implemented a broad-based program
of financial and market reforms, encompassing changes in the structure of the financial
system, prudential and supervisory frameworks, and monetary management.
This paper evaluates the impact of various determinants of savings in Bangladesh—with
special emphasis on the impact of financial reform. A savings function is estimated.
Initial estimates show that the level of income, real interest rates, and the share of
agriculture in GDP have a positive impact on the savings rate. Dependency rate and
public savings rate, on the other hand, have a negative impact on private savings. We do
not find any support for the Ricardian equivalence theorem.
Interestingly, the financial reform index has a negative impact on private savings in
Bangladesh. Hence reforms that were initiated since the late 1980s had actually reduced
savings. This is counterintuitive to the conventional wisdom which argues, based on the
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, that financial reform leads to significant economic
benefits, in particular through a more effective savings mobilization and a more
efficient resource allocation process, by reducing intermediation spreads, financial
deepening, and enhanced access to credit.
An explanation for this result can be traced to the state of the banking sector beginning
as early as 1972. Following independence in 1971, banks were nationalized and
remained strictly under government control. This led to political interference in the
selection of bank management and in loan portfolios. Loans were extended to
institutions and individuals with high credit risks leading to a high default rate.
Moreover, this high proportion of effectively non-performing assets also contributed to
high interest margins and relatively low degree of financial intermediation.
Despite a number of positive changes that have been introduced in the financial sector
following reforms, these factors have adversely affected private savings in the economy.
The pace of reform has not kept in line with the severity of the situation and further
reforms in a timely fashion are necessary. In the absence of any such reform, the costs
to the economy in terms of lower savings and investment due to an increasingly
impaired financial system will continue to grow. This would jeopardize the widely held
expectation of raising economic growth rates in both the short and medium term.
Finally, financial reform in Bangladesh has been an on going process that has
accelerated during the last decade. Given the time dimension of this study, we are
essentially looking at a transitional economy. Thus the results presented here can only
indicate the direction of change during the early years of liberalization, rather than a
complete evolution of the effect of financial liberalization on savings.
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Appendix I: Changes in financial sector policy, 1973-1999
Credit Controls: Directed and controlled credit largely phased out after 1989. Politically
motivated lending remains prevalent. Cash reserve requirements lowered to 5 percent in
the 1990s.
Interest Rates: Interest rates raised to positive real levels in the early 1980s. After 1989,
deposit rates on savings and time deposits subject to a floor. Floor abolished in 1996.
Lending rates for loans freed, except for priority sectors. Priority sector interest rate bands
fixed by the Bangladesh Bank.
Entry Barriers: Private banks permitted, with approval, since early 1980s. More than a
dozen new banks have been established, including some foreign joint ventures. New banks
largely occupy niche markets. Only public banks may lend to priority and public sectors.
The equity market is in its infancy and remain weak. Money markets are almost
nonexistent.
Government Regulation of Operations: Branching restrictions still in place for private
banks.
Privatization: Commercial banks nationalized in the 1970s. Two state-owned banks sold
back to original owners in early 1980s. However, these two banks remain uncompetitive.
International Capital Flows: Foreign Exchange markets unified in 1991-92. Restrictions
on current account transactions eliminated in 1994. Controls on capital inflows eased after
1991.
Source: Williamson and Mahar (1998), IMF Staff Reports, annual reports of central banks, and news
articles.
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Appendix II
The following list summarizes the measures which became part of the Financial Sector
Reform Programme (FSRP) as set out in 1990:
interest rate liberalization
—

floor and ceiling rates for deposits and savings rate

—

Nationalized Commercial Banks/Bangladesh Shilpa Bank lending rates raised
to market rates and abolish lending quota's

—

technical assistance recommending on interest rate levels and monetary
programming

—

government to reimburse interest subsidies to banks;

strengthen bank supervision
—

improve Bangladesh Bank's inspection capability

—

rationalize bank reporting requirements including special reports on stateowned enterprise-borrowing

—

new accounting rules for provisioning and suspension of interest payments

—

establish a credit information bureau

—

external auditing of the Bangladesh Bank

Strengthen Nationalized Commercial Banks
—

recapitalize the Nationalized Commercial Banks through government bonds to
at least 5 percent of deposits

—

strengthen management and accounting practices through training and legal
advice;

—

write-off non-collectable items and improve debt recovery through focus on
100 largest borrowers;

Money market operations
—

amend Bangladesh Bank Act to give it legal powers to issue debt instruments

Legal framework
—

new Financial Loan Courts Act implemented.

Source: Willem Van Der Geest: Default—but no Reform: Financial Sector Issues in Bangladesh, Paper
presented at the International Conference on ‘Development and Business Finance' at the
University of Manchester, April 5-6, 2001.
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Appendix III: Indicators of financial and trade reform
PreReform

Year of
Reform

PostReform

Year

1980

1988

1993

Real deposit interest rate

-6.0

1.0

2.0

Real lending interest rate

-1.0

7.0

11.0

Spreada

7.0

6.0

9.0

M2/GDP ratio

16.0

29.0

33.0

Private sector's share of

35.0

69.0

66.0

8.0

6.0

5.0

1980

1989

1993

Indicators of financial
sector reform (in percent)

total credit
Private Investment/GDP ratio2

Indicators of
trade reform
Year
Average nominal tariff

—

94.0

50.0

Import-weighted average tariff

—

59.0

32.0

Number of tariff bands

24

11

8

Real effective exchange rateb

1

-1

1

Parallel market exch. premium

112

200

—

Total trade/GDP

23

23

25

Note:

a spread between nominal lending and deposit rates
b forward-looking three year averages, except in 1993

Source: International Monetary Fund (1996), author's calculation.
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